


1. Value iteration

Consider the following four-state MDP:



Let the discount factor $\gamma = 0.9$.

- Let π_1 denote a policy that always chooses action a_1 . Write down an equation for the value function V^{π_1} , and solve it.
- Starting from $V_0 = \{0, 1, 0, 1\}$, run several iterations of the value iteration algorithm. For each iteration, calculate the greedy policy.
- When changing the discount factor to $\gamma = 0.4$, and running value iteration until convergence, the optimal policy is $\pi^*(s_2) = a_1$, $\pi^*(s_3) = a_1$. Explain.
- Find the minimal γ for which $\pi^*(s_3) = a_2$.

Solution

a. Using the Bellman equation for a fixed policy $V^{\pi_1} = r + \gamma P^{\pi_1} V^{\pi_1}$, where

$$r = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ -1 \\ -2 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \text{ and } P^{\pi_1} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0.5 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix},$$

Therefore we have

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1-\gamma & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -\gamma & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -0.5\gamma & 0 & 1-0.5\gamma & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-\gamma \end{pmatrix} V^{\pi_1} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ -1 \\ -2 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Solving gives:

$$V^{\pi_1}(s_1) = (1-\gamma)^{-1} = 10$$

$$V^{\pi_1}(s_2) = -1 + \gamma(1-\gamma)^{-1} = 8$$

$$V^{\pi_1}(s_3) = \frac{-2 + 0.5\gamma(1-\gamma)^{-1}}{1-0.5\gamma} = 4.54$$

$$V^{\pi_1}(s_4) = 0$$

b. iteration 1:

$$V_1(s_1) = 1 + \gamma V_0(s_1) = 1$$

$$V_1(s_2) = \max\{-1 + \gamma V_0(s_1), -1 + \gamma V_0(s_4)\} = -1 + \gamma = -0.1$$

$$V_1(s_3) = \max\{-2 + \gamma(0.5V_0(s_1) + 0.5V_0(s_3)), -2 + \gamma V_0(s_2)\} = -2 + \gamma = -1.1$$

$$V_1(s_4) = 0 + \gamma V_1(s_4) = \gamma = 0.9$$

$$\pi_1(s_2) = a_2$$

$$\pi_1(s_3) = a_2$$

Iteration 2:

$$V_2(s_1) = 1 + \gamma V_1(s_1) = 1 + \gamma = 1.9$$

$$V_2(s_2) = \max\{-1 + \gamma V_1(s_1), -1 + \gamma V_1(s_4)\} = -1 + \gamma = -0.1$$

$$V_2(s_3) = \max\{-2 + \gamma(0.5V_1(s_1) + 0.5V_1(s_3)), -2 + \gamma V_1(s_2)\} = -2 - 0.05\gamma = -2.045$$

$$V_2(s_4) = 0 + \gamma V_1(s_4) = \gamma^2 = 0.81$$

$$\pi_2(s_2) = a_1$$

$$\pi_2(s_3) = a_2$$

...

Iteration 200:

$$V^*(s_1) = 10$$

$$V^*(s_2) = 8$$

$$V^*(s_3) = 5.2$$

$$V^*(s_4) = 0$$

$$\pi^*(s_2) = a_1$$

$$\pi^*(s_3) = a_2$$

c. When γ decreases, the immediate negative rewards outweigh the potential positive ones in the future.

d. It is clear that the optimal action in s_2 is a_1 . Let π_2 denote a policy that chooses a_2 in s_3 and a_1 in s_2 . To find the threshold γ we compare $V^{\pi_1}(s_3)$ with $V^{\pi_2}(s_3)$.

From a previous calculation we have $V^{\pi_1}(s_3) = \frac{-2 + 0.5\gamma(1-\gamma)^{-1}}{1 - 0.5\gamma}$, and note that

$$V^{\pi_2}(s_3) = -2 + \gamma V^{\pi_1}(s_2) = -2 + \gamma(-1 + \gamma(1-\gamma)^{-1}).$$

Solving $V^{\pi_1}(s_3) = V^{\pi_2}(s_3)$ gives the threshold $\gamma = 0.5$.

2. Operator notation:

For an MDP with N states and actions $a \in A$, recall the definition of the Bellman operator $T: \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^N$

$$(TJ)(s) = \min_{a \in A} \left\{ r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, a) J(s') \right\}$$

a. Write down $(T^2J)(s)$ explicitly, and relate it to a finite-horizon dynamic programming problem.

b. An operator T is said to have a *monotonicity* property if $J \leq \bar{J} \Rightarrow TJ \leq T\bar{J}$, where the inequality holds element-wise. Show that the Bellman operator is monotone.

c. Show that if T is monotone then T^k is also monotone.

d. Let e denote a vector of ones. Show that $(T^k(J + ce))(s) = (T^k J)(s) + \gamma^k c$.

e. Show that T^k is a γ^k contraction (in the sup-norm).

Solution:

a. We have

$$\begin{aligned}(T^2 J)(s) &= \min_{a \in A} \left\{ r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, a) T J(s') \right\} \\ &= \min_{a_1 \in A} \left\{ r(s, a_1) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, a_1) \min_{a_2 \in A} \left\{ r(s', a_2) + \gamma \sum_{s'' \in S} p(s'' | s', a_2) J(s'') \right\} \right\} \\ &= \min_{a_1, a_2 \in A} \mathbb{E} \left[r(s, a_1) + \gamma r(s', a_2) + \gamma^2 J(s'') \right]\end{aligned}$$

which is exactly the dynamic programming algorithm for a 2-stage discounted problem with initial state s , reward r , and terminal reward $\gamma^2 J$.

b. This may be seen intuitively from (a), but here we calculate it explicitly. Assume $J(s) \leq \bar{J}(s)$ for all $s \in S$. We have

$$\begin{aligned}(TJ)(s) &= \min_{a \in A} \left\{ r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, a) J(s') \right\} \\ &= r(s, a^*) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, a^*) J(s') \\ &\leq r(s, \bar{a}^*) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, \bar{a}^*) J(s') \\ &\leq r(s, \bar{a}^*) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, \bar{a}^*) \bar{J}(s') \\ &= (T\bar{J})(s)\end{aligned}$$

c. We have $J \leq \bar{J} \Rightarrow TJ \leq T\bar{J} \Rightarrow T(TJ) \leq T(T\bar{J}) \Rightarrow \dots \Rightarrow T^k J \leq T^k \bar{J}$.

d. We have

$$\begin{aligned}(T(J + ce))(s) &= \min_{a \in A} \left\{ r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, a) (J(s') + c) \right\} \\ &= \min_{a \in A} \left\{ r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s' | s, a) J(s') \right\} + \gamma c \\ &= TJ(s) + \gamma c\end{aligned}$$

And therefore

$$T^2(J + ce) = T(TJ + \gamma ce) = T^2 J + \gamma^2 ce,$$

And by induction the result follows.

e. For some J and \bar{J} let $c = \max_s \{J(s) - \bar{J}(s)\}$. We have that for all $s \in S$

$$J(s) - c \leq \bar{J}(s) \leq J(s) + c$$

Thus, using the monotonicity property we have

$$T^k(J - ce) \leq T^k(\bar{J}) \leq T^k(J + ce)$$

And using the result of (d) we have

$$T^k(J) - \gamma^k c \leq T^k(\bar{J}) \leq T^k(J) + \gamma^k c$$

Therefore $\max_s \{T^k J(s) - T^k \bar{J}(s)\} \leq \gamma^k c = \gamma^k \max_s \{J(s) - \bar{J}(s)\}$.